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Reviews and Discussion

eth-century abstract painting draw considerably on the
debates about ornament in the nineteenth century.
True, he occasionally offers contemporary abstractions as examples of some of the effects discussed .
However, Gombrich draws a fundamental distinction
between such matters and his aim: " Remembering my
own normal reaction to decoration before I had embarked on this investigation, I was tempted to call this
book 'The Unregarded Art.' ... Painting, like speaking,
implicitly demands attention whether or not it receives
it. Decoration cannot make this demand. It normally
depends for its effect on the fluctuating attention we
can spare while we scan our surroundings'' (p. 116).
So Gombrich, no great fan of abstract painting (1963),
has chosen to complement his study of realistic representation in Art and Illusion with a study not of those
abstractions and semiabstractions that hang on the
important walls of important museums and mansions,
but of the ones that hug coffee spoons and architectural columns, the ones we take for granted.
One could regret this. I confess myself to a moment
of regret when, halfway through The Sense of Order, I
happened to visit the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard
University. On display was a Calder piece, standing on
the floor about chest high, its top a horizontal gesture
of wires and metal plates pivoting on the base. For
some reason, I found it wholly engaging. Not only did it
allow, even compel, my regard, but it departed strikingly from the perceptual armamentarium of ornamental design. There was little repetition in a narrow
sense. There was calculated asymmetry. The curvilinearities were complex, but within the reach of vision to
know them one by one and all together, a feast for the
eye where one could consume every dish, to reverse
Gombrich's expression. "This," I said to myself, "has
nothing to do with the sense of order."
But in the end there were no regrets. The old saying
about gift horses seems relevant here. E. H. Gombrich
has made us his gift, and there is no need to grumble
about how he could have done this or could have done
that. He has, in fact, chosen a neglected corner of our
vision and sought to illuminate it for us. The point is
nicely made by the way he frames his discussionwith a discussion of a picture frame. At the close of his
introduction, Gombrich has a few remarks to make
about an elaborate picture frame, circa 1700, surrounding the Madonna della Sedia by Raphael.
Gombrich says, in part, '' ... on the face of it, it seems
an extraordinarily pointless activity to expend so much
skill and labour on carving and gilding these festoons
with laurel leaves and berries, stretched between fictitious curly brackets of extraordinary elaboration,
which fasten them between shell-shaped forms'' (p.
15). 8-~t by the end of the last chapter, Gombrich is
ready to return with his readers of more informed perception to this same frame. "To the reader who has
shared this journey with me it should have looked pro-
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gressively less puzzling. We recognize in it a version of
the cartouche with four animated motifs oriented toward the field of force they enhance. They are progenies of Gorgon's heads ... "And so on. Yes, the
frame has become more meaningful, one's vision less
naive, in consequence of the rite of passage imposed
by The Sense of Order.

Note
1 This review was prepared at Project Zero , Harvard Graduate School of
Education, with support from the Spencer Foundation . The opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of supporting agencies.
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Reviewed by Carla Sarett
University of Pennsylvania
That there is an essentially metaphorical component in
many diverse realms of symbolic behavior has become
a popular, and even fashionable, concept, and thus it
seems particularly timely to consider some of the philosophical implications of the concept of metaphor itself. The publication of this latest collection of essays,
which had originally appeared as an issue of Critical
Inquiry, should serve to alert scholars to the richness
of contemporary thinking on metaphor that can generally benefit discussions of symbolic phenomena. While
much of the debate in this volume is aimed explicitly at
problems in literary communication, this approach
should not prevent a fruitful extension to related issues
in other fields. Furthermore, the concept of metaphor
is not only relevant to the objects we seek to understand but sheds considerable light on the very process
of analysis. Metaphor, then, seems doubly relevant: It
clarifies the structure of certain forms of symbolic
communication and theories about communication as
well.
Many readers, however, may encounter some difficulty in reading these essays: A good deal of knowl-
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edge about metaphor as well as philosophy is by and
large assumed; the reader approaching this book as
an introduction will occasionally be both frustrated and
baffled. On the other hand, the greater one's exposure
to the history of the debate on metaphor, the more certain is the feeling that the present collection does not
significantly broaden the scope of that debate. Given
the Foreword's promise, one might have hoped that a
truly interdisciplinary perspective would emerge. Such
a perspective would gain theoretical sophistication
and force from the recent contributions of theories on
play, humor, ritual, and linguistic anthropology, to
name but a few potentially exciting resources. Without
in any way diminishing the value of aesthetic and literary theory to the subject of metaphor, it is fair to say
that the exclusion of divergent points of view restricts
the boundaries of the discussion. True, there are offerings from developmental psychology, art, and theology, but in crucial ways these accept the basic logic of
the philosophical debate and do not change its shape
in the way that, for example, Bateson's communicational theory does (Bateson 1972). For that matter,
certain philosophical objections to theories of meaning
and literal language would gain momentum from recent developments in sociolinguistics, where notions
of ordinary language have been attacked (cf. Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1976).
The collection can be thought of as addressing
three basic, and not unrelated, questions. The first
asks to what extent, and in what manner, metaphor
can be said to possess cognitive content. This issue is
best encountered in the essays by Paul Ricoeur and
Donald Davidson, whose views stand in opposition to
one another, but reverberations of it are heard
throughout all the essays. In part, the second question
forms a response to the first: To what extent can metaphor be best explained by its contextual use in social
discourse? Here we find suggestions from psychology,
philosophy, and rhetoric that much is to be gained
from a context-dependent notion of metaphorical
meaning. The other essays can be seen to explore the
consequences that various root metaphors have in
their respective disciplines and to pose the related
question of whether there can exist a discourse not
fundamentally permeated by metaphor.
Historically, the first question has been the crucial
one, with centuries of scholars expelling metaphor
from the province of cognitive discourse. Vico and the
romantic movement posed the first vigorous challenge
to this traditional prejudice, insisting that language's
original roots are primarily metaphorical and furthermore claiming a primacy of the poetic function in revealing the world as it is experienced; however, the romantic view still retained the traditional exclusion of
metaphor from intellectual activity, even if it reversed
the priority of that activity. It was in this century, perhaps when scientific discourse became increasingly

self-conscious about its use of explanatory models,
that the role of metaphor in cognition earned legitimacy. Most would locate the pivotal text as Max
Black's Models and Metaphors, in which the interaction theory of metaphor was proposed, claiming,
among other things, that metaphor was not reducible
to literal assertions and that metaphor does not so
much formulate an antecedent similarity as create it.
In this intellectual era the notion of truth as created
rather than discovered has found ready acceptance.
Still, the status of such newly generated "meaning" or
"truth" does remain problematic in relation to conventionally accepted, or literal, truths. One can reject
metaphor in a way that is clearly forbidden with literal
assertions, and the grounds on which one rejects the
two differ in important ways. To participate in an imaginative vision is perhaps to gain certain insight, but
tempered by the understanding that such insight may
be rejected. Donald Davidson's essay insists that we
not confuse such insight with meaning. His claim is
that there is no hidden message in metaphor apart
from its literal meaning. Theories of metaphor have
mistaken the effect of the metaphor, which is to stimulate and invite comparison, for an encoded content.
"The common error," claims Davidson, "is to fasten
on the contents of the thoughts a metaphor provokes
and to read these contents into the metaphor itself."
Such a hard-headed stance certainly makes a star of
Davidson, prompting heated responses from such worthy opponents as Nelson Goodman and Max Black.
The predictable problems of the ensuing dialogue result, in part, from highly divergent notions of "meaning" as well as "cognitive content." Karsten Harries's
neat reminder that certain slang expressions ("He's an
ac-dc") clearly do express cognitive content disposes
of part of Davidson's argument. Harries is subtle
enough to realize, however, that to the extent that Davidson is dealing with more complex examples of poetic metaphor, he may indeed be onto something,
since the "aboutness" of such metaphors is always
elusive (cf. Sperber 1977).
Paul Ricoeur takes the position that metaphor does
have the capacity to provide untranslatable information and yield true insights about reality, and that it has
this capacity by virtue of certain psychological processes, those of imagination and feeling. His thesis, in
brief, is that the metaphoric form of "split reference"
is structurally analogous to the processes of imagination and feeling, which themselves constitute the complete metaphorical process. Both imagination and feeling involve a "suspension" of literal systems of
reference and emotion by which we are able to maintain the tensional viewpoint required by metaphor and
assimilate new meanings. The metaphorical process
allows us to actively shape and participate in the creation and articulation of meaning in ways denied us by
ordinary language, whose meanings have already
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been given to us. In metaphor, the new semantic congruence is both "felt" and "seen," that is, "We are included in the process as knowing subjects'' {p. 154).
Through this, we become aware of aspects of reality
''which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects
referred to in ordinary language ' ' (p 156). While Ricoeur's debt to Heidegger is clear, his theory also
bears interesting similarities to Michael Polanyi's theory of knowledge in The Tacit Dimension, and a comparison of Polanyi's "tacit knowing" to Ricoeur's metaphorical process might further illuminate the
question of how metaphor functions in cognition.
So intriguing are the structural properties of metaphor that they have overshadowed other aspects of
the picture. Recently, however, theorists have shifted
from a purely semiotic approach to one focusing on
contextual features and the relationship between the
speakers, touching upon the interrelationship between
systems of signification and communication. The essays by Cohen, Davidson, and Booth reflect this trend
with varying degrees of success.
Ted Cohen's essay reflects the problem alluded to
earlier, that of a philosophy unaided by theoretical positions on human communication. He is vulnerable to
this charge for the simple reason that his analysis,
dealing with the establishment of intimacy through
metaphor, might have benefited greatly from such theory. Cohen finds metaphors like jokes in that they both
presuppose prior knowledge on the part of the speakers, and both serve to establish a sense of bonding
from the acknowledgment of such knowledge. Literature on humor enlightens us as to the multiple complexities of such relationships, making Cohen's analysis seem oddly narve (Fry 1 963).
Wayne Booth's discussion of metaphor from the traditional approach of rhetoric is a refreshing reminder
that the functional perspective on language did not
arise with speech act theory; furthermore, his definition of metaphor as "all symbolic inventions that are
intended to be taken non literally'' permits him an admirably broad vision of the subject (p. 50).
The power of contextual factors is given empirical
support from developmental studies of metaphorical
competence. Howard Gardner and Ellen Winner suggest that children's understanding of metaphors is enhanced by embedding them in a situational context
rather than drawing upon prior lexical knowledge. Also
of interest are their studies of brain-damaged patients,
which raise intriguing possibilities. Asked to match
simple tropes with appropriate pictures, aphasiacs
were able to make the correct selection while remaining incapable of paraphrasing the same metaphor;
right-hemisphere patients, on the other hand, displayed the opposite tendency and offered accurate
paraphrase with no corresponding ability to select the
appropriate picture. Gardner and Winner conclude
that ''the neuropsychological evidence suggests that
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both the pragmatic and featural perspectives, taken
together, have some validity, with the crucial variable
being the kinds of tasks posed and responses required'' (p. 138).
The remainder of the essays illustrate how metaphor permeates different realms of social discourse.
Paul de Man's reading of Locke, Condillac, and Kant
finds their philosophical positions on metaphor fraught
with figurative language. Analyzing these metaphors
as a result of particular rhetorical strategies, he concludes that philosophy ''to the extent that it is dependent on figuration" is literary, and cannot be understood properly unless such repressed metaphors are
laid bare. Karsten Harries similarly calls attention to
Heidegger's writings on the ways metaphor shapes
philosophy, making "explicit the fact that philosophical texts refer us less to reality than back to other philosophical texts'' (p. 83).
It should be emphasized that to admit the metaphorical component in disciplines such as science or philosophy does not impoverish the theories they generate. Granted, the presence of repressed metaphor
alerts us to certain normative commitments, but this
should not diminish our appreciation of the explanatory function of models in general. Nor should it
commit us to the hapless relativism that scientific theories are, at best, arbitrary fictions. As Karsten Harries
argues, the modern recognition of the impossibility of
an unmediated reality does not render the belief in objectivity itself meaningless. On the contrary, the very
ability to identify, analyze, and evaluate individual perspectives leads us to pursue a viewpoint which would
permit a truly objective means of encountering reality.
Lacking any belief in this possibility would undermine
the basis of scientific knowledge altogether (Polanyi
1967). Furthermore the commitment to objectivity demands that we explore scientific models in terms of
what they can reveal and explain about observed phenomena (Hesse 1966:162). By affirming the legitimate
role metaphor plays in intellectual activity, we can better understand the insights and achievements of scientific theory, not confusing theory with literal description or carelessly rejecting it in the name of relativism.
The role of metaphor is further clarified by David
Tracy's detailed account of religious and theological
use of metaphor. Although a reader's unfamiliarity with
contemporary theology may make Tracy's a particularly difficult essay, it is worth reading for its successful integration of the interaction theory of metaphor
with concrete textual analysis. Arguing that the study
of metaphor is central to the understanding of religious
experience and thinking, Tracy notes:
The statement "God is love" does not say literally what
God is, but produces a metaphorical meaning for what
God is like. In this redescriptive sense, the statement defines who, for the Christian, God is. [p. 1 03]
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Tracy convincingly demonstrates that a view of metaphor that refuses its capacity to generate new meanings cannot do justice to the role metaphor plays in religious thinking.
Caution must be taken, though, in extending
Tracy's analysis to a more general notion of the truth
value of metaphor. In the case of Scripture, it seems
clear that metaphor does indeed help to establish a
world. But, one is forced to wonder with Karsten Harries, ''to what extent does the scriptural paradigm help
to illuminate poetry in general and, more especially,
the poetry of this godless age?" (p . 172). Harries argues that contemporary poetry as well as art stands in
a radically different relation to reality than do the
words of Scripture, consequently producing a different
use of metaphor. His discussion traces some of the
movements in notions of poetic unity and metaphor.
He locates the telling moment in the transition from the
traditional mimetic theory, which viewed art as about
reality and saw its object as potentially transcending
human understanding, to the aesthetic view of art,
which insists that art be autotelic and resistant to mimesis. Referentiality, according to the aesthetic view,
threatens the telos of the work of art insofar as it relates to a reality outside art. Thus, the purpose of art is
to be a "thing" in the world, to resist its own inherently
metaphorical structure. The work of art is always at
once a material object and a communication, but the
pursuit of presence seeks, in effect, to repress the latter. Insofar as referentiality seems to be unavoidable,
the pursuit of such presence inevitably creates a tension, which Harries relates to the prevalence of collision metaphor in modern poetry, where ordinary
meanings of words are subverted altogether. The
paradoxical reversal of this is that as poetry, as well as
art, approaches this extreme denial of meaning
it may acquire a revelatory power all its own : from the
ruins of literal sense emerges not a new semantic congruence but a silence that is heard as the language of
transcendence. [p. 172]

Furthermore, Harries's hermeneutical account makes
it clear that metaphor is not always best confined to
the domain of pragmatics and the "overly restricted
theory of meaning on which it rests' ' (p. 169). A theory
of meaning that denies that sedimentation of rich
meanings that attach themselves to words and symbols also denies us access to the potentialities of artistic and poetic works. There is a peculiar process at
work when these associations are declared somehow
less "real " than univocal meanings. It is important to
note that such deliberations about meaning do not
have merely philosophical consequences, especially
for those of us who are interested in artistic intepretation. Not only is the potential meaning of a text
a fundamental presupposition upon which acts of in-

terpretation rest; it is also the case that textual analysis, by suppressing the availability of multivocal interpretation, is restricted and, in many cases, unjustified.
Our commonsense notions inform us that we can
"miss the point" of a metaphor, a film, or a painting,
and we believe that additional information and knowledge can enlighten us. Lacking such notions, art historical intepretation becomes absurd. Thus, the question of metaphor is inevitably drawn back into the
larger issues of meaning and communication which
must support it.
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Nadia Chilkovsky Nahumck. Introduction to Dance
Literacy: Perception and Notation of Dance
Patterns. Transvaal: International Library of African
Music, 1978. 95 pp., diagrams, notated staves, practice
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Reviewed by Diane C. Freedman
Temple University
As the interest of social scientists in the expressive
forms of culture increases, new methods are needed
to analyze these forms on a scientific basis. Researchers in dance and body movement have such a tool in
Labanotation, a rigorous and highly developed system
for the analysis and notation of all forms of movement.
Labanotation (Hutchinson 1954) is the trade name
for a system of movement notation developed by Rudolf Laban, a dance educator-scholar born in Bratislava in 1879 (Thorton 1971 ), who revolutionized the
dance world through both his philosophy of movement
and his pragmatic approaches to movement-related
problems. Nahumck has presented us with an introduction to this system designed for dancer and re-

